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INTRODUCTION 
Appellants Christine B. Helfrich and Mary Anne Chesarek (hereinafter "Finan"), 
successors and representatives of the Carmen R. Finan Estate and trustees of the Carmen R. 
Adams Finan Trust, hereby file this Reply Brief of the Appellants in response to Appellee Luke 
L. Adams' brief and respectfully ask the Court of Appeals to reverse the trial court's ruling as 
requested in their initial brief. 
Finan believes that this is an important and appropriate opportunity for the state of Utah 
to clarify existing problems with recording statutes. As these statutes exist now, and as the 
instant case shows, it is possible for a person who is knowingly in breach of a contract to silently 
file a transfer and then merely wait out the prescribed statute of limitations period until the 
fraudulent transfer becomes incontrovertible. This kind of activity is particularly prone to happen 
in non-commercial transactions, among family members or trusted associates, where an 
unspoken duty of honesty is expected. Thus, Finan feels that this case presents the Utah Court of 
Appeals a chance to state not only what the existing law is, but what the law should be. 
Finan does not wish to waste the court's time and has reviewed Rule 24 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure which specifically states that "reply briefs shall be limited to answering 
any new matter set forth in the opposing brief." Finan will hereby address only new matters 
raised in Appellee Luke L. Adams' (hereinafter "Adams") brief, with the understanding that 
some issues addressed in Finan's initial brief may be referenced here for orientation and 
perspective. 
In addition, Finan hereby wishes to correct a technical misunderstanding noted in Adams' 
brief which regards her citation to the record. In Finan's initial brief, she mistakenly cited to 
pages 609 and 611 of the record believing that the 37 pages of the Transcript for Hearing held on 
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December 13, 2010 were numbered consecutively. After contacting the Court of Appeals while 
preparing this brief, Finan learned that the Transcript for Hearing constitutes only one page in the 
record, making her initial references to pages 609 and 611 actually represent pages 573 and 575, 
respectively. Also, this brief will not address the Constitutional arguments argued in Appellants' 
and Appellee's initial briefs. However, Finan believes that this would be the correct forum for 
any Constitutional arguments involving due process, as the issues did not surface in the district 
court until a decision was actually reached. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. Finan's alternative argument is ripe and would entitle her to a portion of Adams' 
interest in the property. 
The first section of Adams' brief goes to great lengths to convince the court that the 1999 
transfer from Adams to himself and his wife as joint tenants with right of survivorship was a 
triggering event anticipated under the Trust Deed Note (hereinafter "Note") the parties had 
agreed to in 1991. Appellee's brief, at pp 9-13. Finan does not dispute this fact in general, as the 
majority of her initial brief attests, except when making an alternative argument under Section 
IV. Appellants' brief, at p 20. Here, Finan argues that if the court rejects her previous arguments 
regarding the six-year statute of limitations and Utah's Equitable Discovery Rule (hereinafter 
"discovery rule"), then the court may deem the 1999 transfer as an event that did not trigger both 
parties' payment obligations under the original Note. That this argument was intended to be 
considered as an alternative to the first argument and not concurrent with it seemed to confuse 
Adams. Adams' brief claims that "Despite asserting that the 1999 Transfer triggered Adams' 
payment obligations under the Note, Finan alternatively argues that the 1999 Transfer was not an 
event that triggered Adams' payment obligations under the note." Adams claims that if this is 
the case, Finan's causes of action would fail because no transfer has occurred and any cause of 
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action would not be ripe. Appellee's brief, at footnote 3. However, Finan clearly intended 
Section IV of her brief to be an alternative argument—an either/or consideration—and stated it 
as such. She did not intend for both arguments to be argued concurrently. 
To contrast Finan's alternative argument that no transfer occurred in 1999 from Adams to 
himself and to his wife, Adams gives definitions of the word "transfer" in hopes of showing that 
under the known facts, a transfer as defined by his sources did occur. However, all three of the 
proffered definitions specify that a transfer is a conveyance from one person to another. 
Appellee's brief, at p 11. This was precisely Finan's point in making her Section IV argument. 
Appellants' brief, at p 20. Thus, even after using the three definitions Adams' provides himself, 
by transferring the Note to himself as part of the joint tenancy with right of survivorship, at least 
half of the transaction didn't involve another1. Adams essentially conveyed half of the property 
from himself to himself, as no other person was involved in that portion of the action. Thus, at 
least half of the property would not be subject to the statute of limitations under this alternative 
argument, assuming this court does indeed reject Finan's primary arguments. 
Finan does not dispute the diligent discussion and briefing Adams gives to the nature of 
the joint tenancy conveyance itself and the various hypothetical outcomes that may flow from it. 
Finan agrees that Adams' wife, upon gaining a half interest in the property, "would have enjoyed 
a full ownership interest in the Property had she outlived Adams," and that "Adams' wife could 
have severed the joint tenancy by conveying her interest in the property." Appellee's brief, at p 
12. However, these events had yet to occur, and as of the date of the transfer on January 22, 
1999, Adams transferred only half of the property to his wife while the other half was not 
transferred to another. Rather than engage in tangential hypothetical regarding the property's 
1
 Adams would own the property wholly if his spouse died because of the right of survivorship. 
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future conveyance, as Adams did, Finan would rather view the facts as they exist. To paraphrase 
a recent movie, "[Finan does] not entertain hypotheticals. The world as it is, is vexing enough." 
Coen E., Coen J. (Directors and Producers). (2010) True Grit [Film]. Hollywood, CA: 
Paramount Pictures. 
II. The six-year statute of limitations should be tolled under the discovery rule. 
Most thoroughly, Adams discusses the discovery rule and argues that it should not be 
used in the instant case to toll the six-year statute of limitations as prescribed by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78B-2-309(2). Adams discusses the initial "threshold showing" required under current Utah 
law and set out in Russell/Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2003 UT App 316 ^{16-17, 78 P.3d 616. 
Appellee's brief, at pp 16-17. The Court of Appeals previously held that "'The first step in 
determining whether the discovery rule applies is to examine whether [Plaintiff] made the 
threshold showing that [Plaintiff] did not know nor should have known,' of its causes of 
action...." Id. Adams argues that Finan cannot meet the required threshold because she did have 
notice of her causes of action due to Adams' recordation of the Trust Deed and Note. Finan 
argued against this proposition in her initial brief by asserting that she was under no duty to 
perform day-to-day inquiries with the Davis County Recorder's Office. Appellants' brief, at pp 
9-11 and Appellee's brief, at pp 23-24. 
Legal scholar W. W. Allen wrote an annotation for American Law Reports directly on 
point with these issues regarding constructive notice, recording statutes, and the accompanying 
statutes of limitations. 137 A.L.R. 268, 276 (1942). Much of the language is applicable to the 
instant case and is repeated below: 
The proposition is frequently announced that, under the registration laws, the 
proper record of an instrument authorized to be recorded is notice to all the 
world. But this means simply that the record of an instrument is notice only to 
those who are bound to search for it. It is not a publication to world at large. 
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The recording of a deed or mortgage, therefore, is constructive notice only to 
those who have subsequently acquired some interest or right in the property 
under the grantor or mortgagor. 
It is apparent, therefore, that where a court decides that a defrauded 
party is charged with notice of facts appearing from the records, so as to 
start the running of the statute of limitations against his action, the ruling 
cannot well be based on the recording laws, because those laws have 
reference to the outstanding rights and interests of third persons and are 
intended to give protection to those who in good faith acquire interests 
in reliance upon the records and who met the conditions laid down. The 
recording laws establish a priority as between innocent claimants to the 
same property or right; they are not intended to give security to the 
perpetrators of fraud as against their victims. As pungently stated in 
Andrews v. Smithwick (1870) 34 Tex. 544, the recording laws do not 
make "provision for the registration of fraud." 
The purpose of recording laws is to notify persons acquiring title or 
rights subsequent to those of record, and not to give protection to the 
perpetrators of fraud. 
Finan would like to reiterate the thrust of Allen's language in a more concise 
format: 
1. Recording notice to all the world means simply that the record of an instrument is 
notice only to those who are bound to search for it. 
2. Recording notice is constructive notice only to those who have subsequently acquired 
some interest or right in the property under the grantor or mortgagor. 
3. When a party makes a claim beyond a statute of limitations and is charged with 
constructive notice, the court's ruling cannot be based on the recording laws. 
4. Recording statutes are not meant to give security to the perpetrators of fraud against 
their victims. 
5. Recording statutes exist to notify persons acquiring title or rights subsequent to those 
of record and not to protect perpetrators of fraud. 
Finan previously argued that allowing constructive notice for the recording of a contract 
under a real estate statute governing deeds could essentially defeat the contract. Appellants' 
brief, at p 12. Adams responded to this argument by recounting Western civilization's history of 
property law and alleging that Finan's assertion is not instructive. Appellee's brief, at p 26. 
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However, the circumstances of the instant case provide a similar scenario to that which was 
denigrated by Adams. 
For example, consider a case where a person buys property from a bank and agrees to 
make payments on it for twenty-years in certain amounts. The agreement says that the person 
couldn't make any transfers of the property and in the event that the person does make a transfer 
of the property, the agreement says that the bank can foreclose on the property. After two years, 
the person who bought the property decides to transfer it to someone else, without notifying the 
bank and while continuing to make payments. It seems absurd to think that the bank is under a 
constant duty to check the recording records for twenty years or risk a running of the statute of 
limitations. Merely by filing the contract, violating it, and then waiting for the applicable 
number of years, any person could conceivably violate the terms of a conveyance. A bad deed or 
conveyance could become a good deed or conveyance simply by remaining uncontested for the 
required statutory period. 
As mentioned, under Russell/Packard, a plaintiff meets the threshold for tolling a statute 
of limitations if she did not know nor should have known of her causes of action. 
Russell/Packard Development, Inc. v. Carson, 78 P.3d 616 at f 16 (Utah App 2003). Finan's 
initial brief gives reasons why she did not know nor should have known of her cause of action 
against Adams. Also, it seems obvious that had Finan known of her cause of action, she would 
have pursued it, considering the amount of money at stake. The fact that she didn't pursue her 
cause of action essentially serves as an indication that she was unaware of it. As soon as she was 
made aware of Adams' transfers, Finan expeditiously pursued legal action to protect her rights. 
Appellants' brief, at pp 4-7. 
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If the threshold requirement is satisfied, Utah law may toll a statute of limitations period 
using the discovery rule. Courts apply the discovery rule in three situations, only two of which 
are applicable in the instant case and both of which have been discussed at length in the parties' 
preceding briefs. Finan claims to meet both of the applicable scenarios named by the court, 
although Adams' explicitly refutes her ability to meet the exceptional circumstances sufficient to 
support application of the rule. Appellee's brief, at p 27. The court is clear in saying that only 
one situation need be evident for the rule to apply. Russell/Packard Development, Inc. v. 
Carson, 78 P.3d 616atf l3 (Utah App 2003). 
Finan's reasons for meeting the exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery rule 
were due to the familial relationship between the parties, the unspoken expectation of honesty, 
Adams taking of a larger portion of the original estate, and the value of the property and its status 
as an inheritance from both parties' mother. Utah's current law states that "The ultimate 
determination of whether a case presents _exceptional circumstances is a question of law and 
turns on a balancing test that examines the hardship the statute of limitations would impose on 
the plaintiff... [as compared with] any prejudice to the defendant from difficulties of proof 
caused by the passage of time" Beaver Cnty. v. Property Tax Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm V?, 
2006 UT 6, P 23, 128 P.3d 1187. Quoting Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 87 (Utah 1981). 
The Utah Supreme Court has also identified several factors which may be relevant to the 
application of the balancing test. These include: (1) whether the defendant's problems caused by 
the passage of time are greater than the plaintiffs; (2) whether the defendant performed a 
technical service that the plaintiff cannot reasonably have been expected to evaluate; and (3) 
whether the claim has aged to the point that witnesses cannot be located, evidence cannot be 
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found, and the parties cannot remember basic events. Sevy v. Security Title Co. ofS. Utah, 902 
P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995). 
With this balancing test in mind, Finan feels that she can show that the hardship of not 
being able to bring her action outweighs the problem of stale evidence due to the passage of time 
presents for Adams. Finan also feels that the problems caused to her by the passage of time are 
much greater than those caused to Adams. This is due primarily to the fact that Finan herself is 
now deceased and cannot be relied upon to provide an accurate accounting of the transactional 
events of the instant case. The second factor promulgated by the Supreme Court does not apply 
to the case at bar, as no technical services were rendered. The third factor may not help Finan 
for the reason mentioned above: she is deceased. However, any applicable evidence is still 
available and the memories of the parties do not seem affected by the passage of time. 
III. Finan correctly determined the amount of damages in the instant case and any 
discrepancies should be construed against Adams. 
Finan feels that the balancing should take into consideration the amount of money at 
stake in this case—money that was an inheritance meant to be distributed equally among the 
parties and their sister. Adams had initially taken a larger proportion of the inherited estate, and 
the Note had to be drafted merely to ensure an equitable dispersion. Adams has disputed the 
amount of damages claimed by Finan, alleging that her damages theory is flawed. Appellee's 
brief, at p 30. Finan had originally asked for 10.135% of the property as originally drafted in the 
Note. At the time the Note was drafted (October 1, 1990), the property in question was valued at 
$129,942.00. An evaluation performed on May 12, 2012 placed the value of the property at 
$1,250,000.00. Finan asked for 10.135% of this amount, or $126,418.30. However, Adams 
asserts, without any briefing or evidence as support, that if the Court of Appeals remands this 
matter back to the District Court, the value of Finan's property should be ascertained from the 
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value of the Property at the time of the 1999 transfer. Appellants' brief, at pp 4-7 and Appellee's 
brief, at p 31. 
The Note itself should govern. (R. at 108-110.) Also, the court should consider the intent 
of the parties who made the Note in determining the proper distribution of its assets. The Note 
was drafted by Adams through the same law firm he is using for the instant case. The 
longstanding contract doctrine of contra proferentem provides that an ambiguous term in a 
contract will be construed against the interests of the party that imposed its inclusion in the 
contract. The Supreme Court of Utah has applied the doctrine of contra proferentem since 1925 
when it said "The doctrine of contra proferentem is strictly applied with unaccommodating 
vigor...". Kavanagh v. The Maccabees, 66 Utah 307; 242 P. 403 at 405. 
Unfortunately for Finan, arguing in favor of an expectation of honesty among family 
members is not the kind of issue that can be researched and briefed. It is not the purpose of the 
courts to legislate morality, and one would not expect them to do so. However, an undisputed 
matter in this case is that Adams made at least one transfer of the property under the Note 
(January 22, 1999, and January 4, 2005). (R. at 102, 114-116). Page 4-7 of Appellants' Brief. 
He then filed a statement with the court proclaiming that no transfer had been made regarding the 
property. (R. at 469). Adams did not dispute this double-dealing in his brief, nor did he admit to 
it. But the documents speak for themselves, as do Adams' actions. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs/Appellants respectfully request that the Court of Appeals 
reverse the trial court's ruling in the following manner: 
• Grant Appellants' motion for summary judgment. 
• Order that Appellee is in default on the Note. 
• Order the payment of the property's sales price as envisioned by the Note, which is 
estimated at $126,418.30 (10.135% of $1.25 million). 
• Or in the alternative, order the foreclosure of the trust deed (order trustee to sell the 
property and pay 10.135% of the sales price to Appellants). 
\ y \ j i \ 
Respectfully Submitted, 
David B. Stevenson, No. 12244 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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